Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
New interface
Preprints, Working Papers, ...

Assessing the threats targeting low latency traffic: the case of L4S

Abstract : New services are designed for the future of Internet, and some of them will require the network to provide low latency traffic. Many optimizations targeting latency reduction have been proposed. Among them, re-architecting congestion control and active queue management (AQM) has been particularly studied. L4S [1,2,3] (Low Latency, Low Loss and Scalable Throughput) is a new network architecture that aims at allowing coexistence between low latency traffic and classic traffic within a single node, involving a dual queue coupled AQM. Although this architecture sounds promising for latency improvement, an attacker can exploit some vulnerabilities to defeat its low-latency features and consequently make some services unusable. In addition, we prove that application-layer protocols such as QUIC can easily be hacked in order to exploit the over sensitivity of those new services to network variations. By implementing undesirable flows in a testbed and evaluating how they impact the delivery of low-latency flows, we demonstrate their reality and the need of research in the detection of this new kind of threats [4,5].
Complete list of metadata

https://hal-utt.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03625582
Contributor : Rémi Cogranne Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, October 7, 2022 - 9:42:08 AM
Last modification on : Sunday, October 9, 2022 - 3:03:12 AM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-03625582, version 1

Citation

Marius Letourneau, Kouamé Boris Ndjore, Guillaume Doyen, Bertrand Mathieu, Rémi Cogranne. Assessing the threats targeting low latency traffic: the case of L4S. 2022. ⟨hal-03625582⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

9

Files downloads

1