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Cross-Evaluation Cost Allocation for Vehicle Routing Games

Abstract : In this paper, we study a cost allocation problem that arises in goods distribution by vehicles. This problem can be formulated as a vehicle-routing game (VRG), where the total distribution cost must be divided among all customers visited by the vehicles. We apply our recently developed solution concept for cooperative games, cross-evaluation value, to the cost allocation. In the solution concept, the allocation of the total cost of a VRG among its players is based on self-evaluation and peer-evaluations of the cost contribution of each player to the grand coalition, subject to the core constraints when the core of the game is not empty. Since the vehicle-routing game may have an empty core, an extended core concept is also proposed for the game, and the cross-evaluation value is then applied to its cost allocation. Numerical examples are presented and discussed.
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Contributor : Jean-Baptiste Vu Van <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, May 6, 2020 - 12:05:52 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, May 7, 2020 - 1:36:30 AM

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Haoxun Chen. Cross-Evaluation Cost Allocation for Vehicle Routing Games. 8th IFAC conference on Manufacturing Modelling, Management, and Control, Jun 2016, Troyes, France. pp.1856-1861, ⟨10.1016/j.ifacol.2016.07.853⟩. ⟨hal-02565236⟩



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