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A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Model for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Abstract : This study takes a sustainable closed-loop supply chain composed of one manufacturer and two price-competitive retailers as the object and considers the two-way risk aversion characteristics of manufacturers and retailers in examining the coordination mechanism in a closed-loop supply chain. Using game theory, optimal decision-making on wholesale prices, retail prices, and recycling prices are explored under decentralized and centralized decision-making scenarios, and representative expressions are established. By analyzing the effects of the risk aversion coefficient on players’ optimal strategies, we found that the manufacturer’s and retailers’ risk aversion coefficients have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, and recycling price under decentralized decision-making, while in a centralized decision-making scenario, the effects are the same. The comparison also found that the wholesale price and recovery price under the centralized decision-making scenario are higher than those under decentralized decision-making. To achieve closed-loop supply chain coordination, we propose a revenue-sharing contract that we demonstrate by coordinating price competition with risk aversion and analyze a range of parameters that influence the revenue-sharing contract. The results show that the proposed contract can increase the profits of supply chain members by identifying the optimal revenue-sharing ratio.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, February 12, 2020 - 2:36:25 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, February 13, 2020 - 1:35:10 AM

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Hao Zou, Jin Qin, Peng Yang, Bo Dai. A Coordinated Revenue-Sharing Model for a Sustainable Closed-Loop Supply Chain. Sustainability, MDPI, 2018, 10 (9), pp.3198. ⟨10.3390/su10093198⟩. ⟨hal-02476052⟩

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