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Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms

Abstract : A monopolist data intermediary collects consumer information that it strategically sells to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. The intermediary charges a price of information and chooses the optimal partition that maximizes the willingness to pay of firms for information. Different selling mechanisms are compared: list prices, sequential bargaining, and auctions. The intermediary optimally sells information through auctions, whereas consumer surplus is maximized with sequential bargaining and list prices. We discuss the regulatory implications of our results.
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Preprints, Working Papers, ...
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https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02288708
Contributor : Antoine Dubus Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, January 27, 2022 - 10:39:57 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, April 7, 2022 - 3:40:26 AM

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  • HAL Id : hal-02288708, version 5

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David Bounie, Antoine Dubus, Patrick Waelbroeck. Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms. 2022. ⟨hal-02288708v5⟩

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